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(NUHWSSA) valid?
(2) Is the Hazardous Waste Interstate Export Ban of the
New Union Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act
(NUHWSSA) valid?
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OPINIONS BELOW
The District Court for the District of New Union deemed
NUHWSSA was within constitutional limits and also con-
cluded that NUHWSSA imposed an equal burden on out-of-
state and in-state generators of hazardous waste. The lower
court also found that hazardous waste was legally distinguish-
able from solid waste. From the District Court's findings, En-
vironmental Disposal Corporation (EDC) and Cleanfill Ser-
vices Incorporated (CSI) petition for appeal to the Twelfth
Circuit.
STATUTES INVOLVED
The texts of the following statutes relevant to the deter-
mination of the present case: The Commerce Clause, Article I,
section 8 of the U.S. Constitution; The Supremacy Clause,
Art. VI. cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution; Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929; § 1002
(b)(7),(8), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (b)(7), (8); Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
§ 104(c)(9), 42 U.S.C.
604(c)(9).
SEVERABILITY
New Union asserts that if either section 3 or section 4 of
NUHWSSA are invalid, then the entire Act becomes invalid.
No provision in NUHWSSA, however, allows for this type of
total invalidation. If the legislature intended to include such a
provision, they had ample opportunity to do so while drafting
NUHWSSA. This issue of severability was addressed by New
Union's General Counsel of State Environmental Affairs who
happened to reaffirm New Unions severability position. Opn.
at 4.
New Union argues that if the import ban is found invalid,
the export ban must be invalidated as well. New Union asserts
there would be no politically viable reason to enact the export
ban without the corresponding import ban. Opn. at 5. The rel-
evant inquiry in evaluating severability of unconstitutional
provisions from the remainder of a statute is whether the stat-
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ute will function in a manner consistent with legislative intent
without the provision. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678,
680 (1987). The export ban alone, however, will serve New
Union's policy objectives under NUHWSSA. To allow New
Union's legislature to "after the fact" add an invalidity clause
is not only inconsistent with legislative discretion, but defies
the plain language of NUHWSSA.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under de novo review, the appellate court is neither com-
pelled to adhere to the district court's interpretation of state
law, nor does it give great weight to its interpretation. Rather,
the appellate court makes its own independent determination
of state law issues based upon recognized sources available to
the parties. U.S. v. Nacrdi, 63 3 F.2d. 977 (9th Cir. 1981).
EDC maintains that other standards would not serve the
interests of justice for two reasons. On the one hand, if the
court employs a "clearly deferential standard," then appellate
courts typically examine whether plausible support existed for
the district judge's decision thus affording it presumptive va-
lidity. e.g. King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d. 1313 (10th Cir
1983); Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d. 870 (10th Cir. 1982) ;
Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Levitt, 670 F.2d. 860 (9th Cir.
1982). When validity is presumed, the right to appellate re-
view is severely curtailed and there is no full, independent re-
view by the appellate court unless clear error is determined.
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 209 (1956) .
On the other hand, appellate courts often interpret "clear
error" to mean they are bound by the district court's decisions
unless the district court was "clearly erroneous" Id. at 209. To
the extent the "clear error" standard rests on the faculties of
a federal judge interpreting state law without clear guidance
from the state's supreme court, the district court decisons run
the risk of being overly subjective. McLinn v. F/V Fjord, 739
F.2d. 1395, 1404 (9th Cir. 1984).
The Ninth Circuit in McLinn v. F/V Fjord subsequently
determined that the only standard of review that appropri-
ately served the appellate function was the de novo standard;
19931
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thus, it adopted that standard of review for the Ninth Circuit.
Mc Linn, 735 F. 2d at 1397. As the first appellate interpreta-
tion of NUHWSSA proceeding without official guidance from
New Union's Supreme Court, EDC respectfully requests a de
novo standard of review. Under present circumstances, de
novo review is the best method to ensure that an independent
review is conducted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EDC operates a hazardous waste facility at a site in
Springfield, New Union. New Union is one of the states in the
tri-state Union-Hampshire region, consisting of New Union,
North Hampshire, and South Hampshire. The EDC facility at
Springfield is one of ten hazardous waste sites located in New
Union. There are four other hazardous waste facilities in the
entire tri-state region, two each in both North Hampshire and
South Hampshire. Almost all of the hazardous waste gener-
ated within the three states is disposed of within the region.
Approximately one half of the waste generated in New Union
is treated at the four sites in North Hampshire and South
Hampshire. The remaining waste generated in New Union is
treated within New Union itself.
The EDC facility treats and disposes of approximately
one quarter of all waste generated within the State of New
Union. This facility also handles most of the hazardous waste
generated in the neighboring States of North and South
Hampshire. The primary reason for the large volume of waste
processed at the EDC facility is its ability to treat DBCP, a
deadly toxic waste. According to the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) "land ban" regulations, DBCP
must be incinerated. The Springfield site uses a type of high
temperature incineration which is suited for DBCP treatment.
After incineration, the remaining ash is placed in a specially
constructed container for storage.
The facility at Springfield is the only hazardous waste
site in the tri-state region that can treat DBCP. DBCP is an
unintended by-product in many manufacturing processes.
Three North Hampshire factories and two South Hampshire
[Vol. 10
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factories produce pure DBCP as a waste by-product. EDC's
Springfield facility also has a federal RCRA permit allowing it
to treat DBCP.
In 1977 New Union enacted a hazardous waste treatment
program entitled the New Union Conservation and Recovery
Act (NURCRA). This program is not approved by the federal
government under RCRA, and New Union never sought such
approval. Under NURCRA, all hazardous waste treatment
and disposal facilities may only be sited on state-owned land.
In exchange for a ninety-nine year lease with New Union, fa-
cility operators must pay all necessary operating and con-
struction costs for the site. NURCRA also requires operators
to pay New Union ten percent of each year's profits as rent on
the land.
In 1990 an accident occurred involving the transportation
of DBCP. A truck carrying a two gallon container of DBCP
overturned on a New Union highway. The container ruptured
and DBCP vapors escaped, exposing a local farmer to the
toxin. DBCP's effects on humans is similar to nerve gas and
can cause paralysis leading to death. The truck driver saved
the farmer by administering an antidote. The New Union De-
partment of Emergency Response spent approximately
$1,400,000 responding to the accident. The State requested
CERCLA reimbursement from the parties involved in trans-
porting DBCP.
Later that year, New Union held legislative hearings re-
garding hazardous waste. The Chair of the State Senate's En-
vironmental Protection Committee asked the General Counsel
of New Union's Department of Environmental Affairs about
the legality of hazardous waste import and export bans. Upon
an affirmative response the State enacted the New Union
Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act (NUHWSSA ).
NUHWSSA bans both hazardous waste imports and exports.
New Union justified NUHWSSA as a step toward both haz-
ardous waste self-sufficiency, and compliance with CERCLA
section 104(c)(9). EDC took action against New Union in May
1991, claiming the import ban of NUHWSSA violates the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. New
Union responded by maintaining the import ban was a proper
1993]
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exercise of state police power. CSI, which owns a hazardous
waste chemical treatment facility located in North Hamp-
shire, also filed suit against New Union, challenging the valid-
ity of New Union's export ban.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court improperly upheld the constitutional-
ity of NUHWSSA by declaring it balanced act on the whole.
EDC believes the import ban is invalid and that New Union's
export ban should remain valid. To support these contentions
EDC's arguments fall into three broad categories: 1) Dormant
Commerce Clause issues, 2) Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act issues, and 3) Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act and related policy
arguments.
I.
The export ban survives Dormant Commerce Clause scru-
tiny. New Union's policy concerning the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens and environment enables the
state to impose the export ban as a valid exercise of the
state's police power. As a result, New Union's-compelling local
interests cause only incidental effects on interstate commerce
and enable the state to pass the tripartite Pike v. Bruce
Church test. The test examines (1) whether the challenged
statute regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on
interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate com-
merce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the
statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and if so; (3) whether
alternative means could promote this local purpose as well
without discriminating against interstate commerce. More-
over, the nature of New Union's health and safety objectives
cannot be served as well by non-discriminatory alternatives.
With regard to the "stricter scrutiny" test under Hughes v.
Oklahoma, EDC believes the magnitude of New Union's po-
lice power concerns withstands stronger constitutional exami-
nation. Upon examining cases under the market participant
exemption, New Union falls within the protection of this
[Vol. 10
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doctrine.
Regarding the import ban, EDC advocates that the over-
whelming weight of precedent makes import bans facially dis-
criminatory. Facially invalid import bans invoke the strictest
scrutiny of the state's purported legitimate purpose and non-
discriminatory alternatives. Applying anything less than strict
scrutiny runs against established precedent and the latest Su-
preme Court decisions regarding the Dormant Commerce
Clause and hazardous waste management.
II.
RCRA defines the federal role in the joint state and fed-
eral regulation of hazardous waste. RCRA provides a perva-
sive, cradle-to-grave federal regulatory program for hazardous
waste generators, transporters, and operators of treatment
storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities.
New Union's import ban prohibiting hazardous waste
similarly subverts federal objectives by directly impairing spe-
cific provisions in RCRA dealing with the transportation, stor-
age or disposal of hazardous waste. EDC believes New Union's
import ban requires preemption for two reasons. First, the im-
port ban stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex-
ecution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress and
thereby requires preemption under the Supremacy Clause.
Second, since case law interpreting RCRA section 3009 only
provides for more stringent requirements than those imposed
by the federal government, not outright bans on such activity,
New Union's attempt to ban imports falls outside its dele-
gated authority.
III.
New Union's attempt to justify its import ban based on
section 104(c)(9) of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is incon-
sistent with both case decisions and congressional intent. Re-
garding congressional intent, even though Congress had the
opportunity to include provisions allowing import bans in the
1986 CERCLA amendments, no such measures were taken.
1993]
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Moreover, Congress included an import ban in the language of
the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA) and
would have presumably done the same in CERCLA if it de-
sired. In National Solid Waste Management Ass'n. v. Ala-
bama, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a similar import ban.
Interpreting section 104(c)(9), the court provided viable op-
tions for achieving the goals of section 104(c)(9) short of an
impermissible import ban. EDC maintains the real intent be-
hind the statute is not to comply with 104(c)(9), but to impose
protectionist measures to keep DBCP and other contaminants
from state highways.
ARGUMENT
I. ALTHOUGH NUHWSSA'S EXPORT BAN IS A
PROPER EXERCISE OF NEW UNION'S POLICE
POWER, NUHWSSA' IMPORT BAN IS UNCONSTI-
TUTINAL UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE.
A. New Union's Export Ban survives the Pike v. Bruce
Church balancing test under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides,
"The Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations and among the several States . . . " U.S.
CONST. art. I, sec. 8. The Commerce Clause enables Congress
to regulate commerce between the states and to directly limit
the power of the states to discriminate against interstate com-
merce. Limits on states' power to advance their own commer-
cial interests by burdening commerce are called the "dormant
or negative aspect" of the Commerce Clause.
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535, 69 S.
Ct. 657, 663 (1949). If a state's regulatory measure promotes
economic protectionism, or promotes in-state interests at the
expense of eliminating or unduly discriminating against out-
of-state competitors, then the regulation will be held invalid.
The statute will be held valid, however, if the state can prove
a legitimate state interest unrelated to economic protection-
[Vol. 10
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ism and the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives. Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 135, 137, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2447 (1986).
In determining whether a state overstepped its role in
regulating interstate commerce, courts recognize two classes of
state statutes. The first class, which incidentally burden inter-
state commerce, are examined under the Pike v. Bruce
Church test. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct. 844
(1990) . The second class, which facially discriminate against
interstate transactions, must overcome the rigid standard ap-
plied in Hughes v. Oklahoma. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 99 S. Ct. 1727 (1979) .
EDC urges using the more flexible test set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church. Under similar facts in Harvey & Harvey v.
Delaware Solid Waste, 600 F.Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985), a
U.S. District Court validated a comparable export ban. The
court found the state regulation attached to an important
state health concern, and thereby did not materially favor in-
state economic interests, causing incidental impacts on com-
merce between the states. 600 F. Supp. at 1381.
Examining state regulations that incidentally burden
commerce, Pike v. Bruce Church posed a three part test; (1)
whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with
only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce either on its face or in prac-
tical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local
purpose, and if so,- (3) whether alternative means could pro-
mote this local purpose as well without discriminating against
interstate commerce. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 99 S. Ct. at 1736.
Involving the first prong of the Pike test, New Union's
ban only regulates against exports of hazardous wastes while
allowing exports of non-hazardous solid wastes. Thus, EDC
argues the challenged ban regulates evenhandedly with only
incidental effects on interstate commerce. The ban is not
facially discriminatory and can be distinguished from Chemi-
cal Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992). In
Hunt, Alabama imposed an additional fee on hazardous waste
generated outside of the state and disposed of within the
state. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Alabama's differen-
tial fee was facially discriminatory and thereby violated the
1993]
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Commerce Clause. Hunt, at 2011. New Union's ban does not
impose differential fees on out-of state wastes, and out-of-
state wastes are not given differential treatment. NUHWSSA
allows the import of wastes while keeping New Union's haz-
ardous wastes at home. Dissenting in Hunt, Justice Rehnquist
argued that states may take actions legitimately directed at
the preservation of the State's natural resources, even if those
actions incidentally disadvantage some out-of-state genera-
tors. Hunt, at 2017. If a state can take action to protect its
natural resources, then a state should also be afforded this
same defference when taking steps to retain hazardous wastes
to ensure their safe and proper disposal. Since NUHWSSA
does not treat out-of-state waste differently, the challenged
ban regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on in-
terstate commerce.
The second part of the Pike test involves the legitimacy
of the state's local purpose. States retain authority under
their general police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate
local concern' even though interstate commerce may be af-
fected. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 135, 106 S. Ct. 2440,
2447. Under the State's police power, New Union's local inter-
est protects the health and safety of its citizens and environ-
ment. EDC maintains the first step toward this goal is to
eliminate the transportation of hazardous wastes across state
lines. New Union enacted NUHWSSA in the aftermath of a
highly toxic chemical spill. Opn. at 4. The spill occurred dur-
ing transport, and New Union's policy protects the health and
safety of its citizens by reducing the distance hazardous chem-
icals are transported within its boundaries. By disposing haz-
ardous waste at one of New Union's ten intrastate disposal
facilities, the distance traveled by hazardous wastes is reduced
drastically. By reducing the distance traveled, EDC believes
New Union's policy minimizes risks of future accidents that
could deathly harm New Union's citizens. This is a legitimate
local purpose and by keeping the wastes within New Union,
NURCRA ensures that the state's concern will be accom-
plished. The ban ensures that DBCP and other hazardous
wastes will be disposed of safely. Moreover, if New Union's
citizens do not favor the export ban, then New Union's citi-
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zens can amend NUHWSSA. This will also protect the out-of-
state disposal sites who may be affected by the export ban.
The third prong of the Pike test is whether alternative means
could promote this local purpose as well without discriminat-
ing against interstate commerce. The extent of the burden tol-
erated depends upon the legitimacy of the local interest in-
volved, and on whether it could have been promoted with a
lesser impact on interstate commerce. Hughes v. Oklahoma,
99 S. Ct. at 1736. To the extent other alternatives exist, they
frustrate NUHWSSA's health and safety objectives. For ex-
ample, New Union could impose price reductions on facilities,
encouraging generators to dispose of hazardous waste in state.
With each New Union facility only possessing a one-tenth
market share, they arguably charge competitive market prices.
To artificially reduce these prices would cause in-state facili-
ties to reduce operating expenses such as possibly safety regu-
lations, monitoring efforts, and cleanup measures.
As a result, non-discriminatory alternatives do not serve
the state's purpose in protecting environmental health and
human safety. In light of compelling health and safety efforts,
it cannot be successfully argued that the export ban is an ex-
ample of economic protectionism. The state regulation at-
taches to an important health and environmental concern.
There are no alternative means which can promote the local
interest as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce.
The facts on hand can be distinguished from Fort Gratiot
Landfill v. Mich. Dept. of Nat. Res., 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992). In
Fort Gratiot, Michigan banned private landfill operators from
accepting solid waste originating outside the county. The U.S.
Supreme Court found the statute violated the Commerce
Clause since other less discriminatory alternatives existed,
and the Court could not find any legitimate reason for al-
lowing petitioner to accept waste from inside the county but
not waste from outside the county. Fort Gratiot, at 2028.
NUWUSSA's valid export ban allows wastes from outside of
the state as well as those within the state to be disposed of
within New Union. Opn at 3. To this extent, New Union at-
tempted to make a good faith effort to deal with the hazard-
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ous waste disposal problem by ensuring that hazardous wastes
are disposed of within the state under NURCRA guidance.
B. NUHWSSA'S Export Ban survives the Commerce
Clause Strict Scrutiny Test
The second class of state statutes, which facially discrimi-
nate, are subject to the more demanding test applied in
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 99 S. Ct. at 1737. Such facial discrimi-
nation by itself may be a fatal defect regardless of the state's
purpose because the "evil of protectionism can reside in legis-
lative means as well as legislative ends." Id. at 1737. Accord-
ing to Hughes, " . . . such facial discrimination invokes the
strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose
and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. at
1737-38. Like the Pike test, the Hughes test compares the
burdens and benefits flowing, from the regulation, but the pur-
ported state interest is examed under stricter scrutiny. Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 139, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986).
Applying the strict scrutiny test, the Supreme Court in
Hughes found an import ban violated the Commerce Clause
even though the state proved to have a legitimate local inter-
est. Hughes, however, can be distinguished because other non-
discriminatory alternatives existed which paralleled the local
purpose. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1727 at 1737. For example, when
Oklahoma wanted to avoid the removal of inordinate numbers
of minnows, the court determined Oklahoma officials chose
the most discriminatory means available. Hughes, 99 S. Ct.
1727 at 1737. Oklahoma chose an export ban in lieu of viable
alternatives such as placing limits on the amounts of minnows
taken by local dealers. Hughes, at 1737. Moreover, there is a
fundamental difference between minnows and hazardous
waste. Minnows cannot "manifest themselves [having] proper-
ties as nerve gas .. . [where] even a tiny drop inhaled can
cause convulsions, and moments later ...paralyze the ner-
vous system leading to lung failure and inevitable death."
Opn. at 3. As the dissent noted in Fort Gratiot Landfill v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, local interests should
be recognized because "Nothing in the Commerce Clause re-
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quires [states] to adopt an 'all or nothing' regulatory approach
for hazardous materials." Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Mich. Dep't
of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2018 (1992) (citing
Mintz v. Baldwin, 53 S. Ct. 611 (1932)).
In short, New Union's ban protects the health and safety
of its citizens and of its environment. This is a legitimate state
purpose because nondiscriminatory alternatives fail to ade-
quately serve similar and important needs. Therefore, to the
extent NUHWSSA incidentally burdens interstate commerce,
New Union's policy survives the Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis espoused in Pike. Even if the export ban is found to
be discriminatory on its face, this court should recognize a
state's power to manage hazardous waste for legitimate health
and safety concerns.
C. New Union is a market participant regarding the
Export Ban
When a state enters the market as either a purchaser or
seller of interstate commerce, it is considered a market par-
ticipant and nothing in the Dormant Commerce Clause pro-
hibits its own purchases or limits its own sales to its citizens.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810, 96 S. Ct.
2488, 2498 (1976). A bright line does not exist between market
participant and market regulator; the issue "is a fuzzy one
that has perplexed courts and commentators alike." Alaska v.
Anchorage, 953 F. 2d. 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless,
when a state tries to impose its will by force of law, or com-
pels private action through the exercise of raw governmental
power, the state is generally deemed to be acting as a market
regulator. Coenen, Untangling the Market Participant Ex-
emption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV.
395, at 411 (1989).
The distinction between a market participant and a mar-
ket regulator caused considerable dispute within the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court through four cases attempted to
delineate the market participant exception to the commerce
clause. These cases provide insight into a working definition.
To understand why New Union acts as a market participant
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as opposed to a regulator, it is essential to examine three cases
upholding the market participant doctrine and the one plural-
ity case that limits the doctrine.
The three cases upholding the market participant excep-
tion are: Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426, U.S. 794, 96
S. Ct. 2488 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 100 S.
Ct. 2271 (1980) ; White v. Mass. Council of Construction Em-
ployees, 460 U.S. 204, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983) . In Alexandria
Scrap, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland's statutory
scheme to rid the state of derelict automobiles even though
the plan involved two types of discrimination. First, Maryland
.paid bounties to in-state scrap auto hull processors while re-
fusing to pay bounties to out-of-state processors on the same
terms. Second, Maryland paid bounties only for vehicles for-
merly titled in Maryland. Maryland's discriminatory practice
was allowed since the state was deemed a market participant
because of its position in the commercial stream. As stated in
Alexandria Scrap, "nothing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congres-
sional action, from participating in the market and exercising
the right to favor its own citizens over others." Hughes v. Al-
exandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 at 810. Under New Union's
leasehold arrangements, the state receives a 10% annual share
in the profits from its hazardous waste facilities. Opn. at 3. By
taking an active stance in the operation and success of its haz-
ardous waste facilities, EDC asserts New Union has the right
to favor its own citizens over others as demonstrated in Alex-
andria Scrap.
In Reeves v. Stake, the Court embraced the market par-
ticipant exception even though South Dakota confined the
sale of cement by a state operated cement plant to residents
of South Dakota. Reeves held the state was a market partici-
pant even though an out-of-state corporation, which pur-
chased about 95% of its cement from South Dakota's plant
for over twenty years, was forced to cut production by over
75% as a result of the policy. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 433, 100
S.Ct. at 2286. The Court concluded that, "South Dakota as a
seller of cement clearly fits the market participant label." Id.
at 433, 100 S. Ct. at 2286. The Court relied upon, "the long
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recognized right of traders or manufacturers engaged in an en-
tirely private business freely to exercise their own indepen-
dent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." Id. at
2274. As in Reeves, New Union qualifies as a seller because it
leases to operators while maintaining a partnership interest in
each site. By holding leases to the hazardous waste facilities,
it appears that New Union holds a comparable merchant posi-
tion to South Dakota. Moreover, under CERCLA § 101 and
107, New Union qualifies as an "owner" because of the lease-
hold and ten percent profit arrangement.- 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A), § 9607(a). New Union should be afforded simi-
lar discretion regarding domestically processed hazardous
waste.
Further, the Supreme Court in White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers found that a local action
fell within the market participant doctrine even though the
statute required federally funded construction projects to em-
ploy at least fifty percent local residents. This requirement di-
rectly influenced private firms' employment and hiring prac-
tices. White, 460 U.S. 204 at 211. North and South Hampshire
may assert that New Union's export ban affects out-of state
entitles that do not have a legislative voice within New Union.
Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767, 65 S.Ct. 1515,
1519. The Supreme Court recognized, however, that the Com-
merce Clause places no limitations on a State's refusal to deal
with particular parties when the State participates in the in-
terstate market. Reeves, 100 S. Ct. at 2244.
Finally, in a plurality decision in Wunnicke, the Court
struck down the conclusion that the Alaska was a market par-
ticipant and expressed limits to the market participant doc-
trine. South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82, 104 S. Ct. 2237. The Court noted, "That Alaska's
policy crossed the line distinguishing participation from regu-
lation because the conditions it attached to its timber sales
amounted to 'downstream regulation' of the timber processing
market of which it is not a participant." Id. at 2246. In the
instant case, the export ban does not regulate downstream
into other markets; it merely designates a preference for using
its own waste sites for its own hazardous wastes. The plain
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language of Wunnicke serves to prevent states from affecting
subsequent or collateral markets. Since New Union's presence
in the disposal market places it at the 'end of the disposal
ladder,' it cannot adversely affect subsequent markets. By
New Union's very position it is the furthest downstream en-
tity. Therefore, New Union has not crossed the Wunnicke line
and retains its market participant protection. Moreover,
Wunnicke is only a plurality opinion.
By applying the reasoning from the four cases, New
Union is a market participant in the hazardous-waste disposal
market. If Maryland may decree that only those with Mary-
land's auto hulks will receive state bounties, then New Union
can similarly decree that its hazardous wastes will be disposed
in state. If South Dakota gave preferential treatment to its
citizens' cement sales, then New Union may also give prefer-
ence to its localized hazardous waste concerns. Finally, if Bos-
ton can limit jobs to local residents, then New Union can em-
ploy measures to show preference by keeping only hazardous
wastes in state. Swin Resource Systems, Inc., v. Lycoming
County, 883 F.2d 245 at 250 (3rd. Cir. 1989) . Therefore by
applying the above mentioned cases, EDC maintains the ex-
port ban is valid since New Union is a market participant in
the waste disposal market.
D. New Union's Import Ban cannot withstand the in-
surmountable precedent opposing protectionist in-
terstate trade practices.
A number of U.S. Supreme Court and federal court deci-
sions have ruled that, absent an express grant of authority
from the Congress, states are powerless to ban the importa-
tion of out-of-state waste into landfills located in their juris-
dictions. Any such restriction is deemed impermissible dis-
crimination against interstate commerce, as was found in the
following cases: City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1977) ; Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct.
2009 (June 1, 1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (June 1,
1992); Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980) ;
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Washington Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) ;
Industrial Maintenance Service v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436
(S.D. W.VA 1987) ; Government Suppliers Consol. Services,
Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990) ; National
Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F.Supp.
244 (S.D. Ohio 1991), appeal pending, No. 91-3466 (6th Cir.);
National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't
of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), modi-
fied, 924 F.2d 1001, cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991). These
cases reflect the court's alertness to guard against economic
protectionism, and isolationism, while recognizing that inci-
dental burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable
when a state passes waste bans in order to safeguard the
health and safety of its citizens.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, is the
benchmark Supreme Court case on this issue. The Supreme
Court stated that the crucial inquiry was to determine, "If the
regulation was a protectionist measure or whether it could be
viewed as a law directed at legitimate local concerns with inci-
dental effects on interstate commerce." Id at 2535. The risks
of New Union's protectionist measures become evident upon
examining the tri-state hazardous waste market. None of the
other states can legally dispose of the DBCP. Opn. at 3.
EDC's Springfield facility is the only RCRA permitted facility
capable of incinerating this highly toxic substance. Opn at 3.
By banning imports of hazardous wastes, the monumental
burden on the out-of-state generators, transporters, and citi-
zens would be both costly and dangerous. Moreover, the mon-
umental burden imposed on such commerce is clearly exces-
sive in relation to the putative local benefits. Pike, 90 S. Ct. at
847.
New Jersey's holding was one of the first cases that
seemed to apply a per se rule of invalidity to discriminatory
statutes that promoted economic protectionism. Other deci-
sions followed New Jersey's lead. For example, in Hughes v.
Oklahoma, the Court stated that, " . . . such facial discrimi-
nation by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's
purpose, because the evils of protectionism can reside in legis-
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lative means as well as legislative ends." Hughes v. Oklahoma,
99 S. Ct. at 1737. EDC believes both New Union's legislative
means and ends directly discriminate against interstate trade.
New Union's means banned any and all imports of hazardous
waste without regard to federal or state concerns about haz-
ardous waste management. Opn. at 3. New Union's protec-
tionist ends resemble the interstate economic balkanization
that the Commerce Clause was historically designed to pre-
vent. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54
U.S. (13 How.) 518, 587 (1852).
The Supreme Court continued to state that such facial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported
legitimate local purpose. Applying this strict scrutiny stan-
dard to the facts on hand, the import ban must fall. If New
Union wants to keep hazardous wastes out of the state, they
have other nondiscriminatory alternatives. For instance, New
Union could increase the price of disposal making it unattrac-
tive for states to send their hazardous wastes to EDC. Since
other alternatives exist, New Union's health and safety con-
cerns cannot justify the state's import ban. In essence, as was
the case in New Jersey, "Regardless of the state's purpose, it
cannot accomplish its purpose by discriminating against arti-
cles of commerce coming from outside the state." City of Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531 at 2537.
E. Applying any standard less than Strict Scrutiny to
Import Bans undermines Stare Decisis.
Regarding the overwhelming precedent strictly prohibit-
ing import bans, if this court applied the lesser Pike standard
it would depart from stare decisis. The line of cases dealing
with import bans adhere to the strict scrutiny analysis devel-
oped in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, and reinforced in the Su-
preme Court's most recent decisions in Fort Gratiot Landfill
v. Mich. Dep. of Nat. Res., 112 S. Ct. 2019 (June 1992), and
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (June
1992). Holding that" . . . no state may attempt to isolate it-
self from a problem common to the several states by raising
barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce," the Court in
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Hunt struck down a discriminatory fee that resulted in a de
facto import ban. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 212. Therefore, after
examining both standards of review, the Supreme Court's
most recent decisions, and the overwhelming quantity of deci-
sions holding import bans invalid, New Union's import ban is
similarly invalid.
F. New Union cannot qualify as a market participant
regarding the Import Ban.
The import ban facially discriminates against interstate
commerce. Unlike the situation with the export ban, New
Union may not claim the protection of the market participant
doctrine. By extending its domestic policy into the tri-state
hazardous waste market, New Union has gone into other
states' markets and directly regulates collateral markets. For
the export ban, however, New Union participated only in its
domestic hazardous waste market. By contrast, the import
ban directly regulates collateral markets, forcing out-of-state
generators and transporters to seek other disposal sites. New
Union has crossed the line becoming a market regulator.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2244. At least with the export ban,
New Union favored its own citizens over out-of-state resi-
dents, which is allowed under the market participant doctrine.
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 96 S. Ct. 2488 2498 (1976).
G. New Union cannot justify the Import Ban under
quarantine laws.
The quarantine laws mostly banned diceased livestock
and other noxious objects that had to be promptly destroyed
as close to their point of origin as possible. City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 620, 98 S. Ct. 2534. Since
there are no facilities outside of New Union capable of dispos-
ing DBCP, EDC's facility is the closest site to the toxin's
point of origin . Banning the import of hazardous waste in
this situation frustrates the the purpose of quarantine laws
and would pose an unacceptable burden on interstate com-
merce. Id. at 2538.
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II. NEW UNION'S IMPORT BAN IS INCONSISTENT
WITH FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE OBJEC-
TIVES AND REQUIRES PREEMPTION UNDER THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE.
A. Preemption is warranted to the extent New Union's
Import Ban conflicts with specific federal law and
exceeds delegated state authority.
In 1976 Congress enacted RCRA because "the problems
of waste disposal ... had become a matter national in scope
and in concern, and state waste management planning was in-
adequate or non-existent." 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4); H.R. Rep.
No 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976); 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N
6238, 6240 available in WESTLAW, Lh Library. RCRA pro-
vides a pervasive, cradle-to-grave federal regulatory program
for hazardous waste generators, transporters, and operators of
treatment storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
art. VI. cl. 2, preempts any state or local laws that interfere
with or are contrary to federal law. Hillsborough Co. v. Auto-
mated Medical Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712, 105 S.Ct. 2371,
2375, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) . There are three ways that a fed-
eral law may preempt a state law. Ogden Envtl. Services v.
City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1442 (S.D. Cal 1988).
First, federal law may contain an explicit preemption provi-
sion thus expressing Congressional intent. Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) . Second, federal law may
be sufficiently comprehensive to create the inference that
Congress intended to occupy the entire field of regulation. Pa-
cific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) . Finally, although the
federal law may not entirely displace state law, a particular
state regulation may actually conflict with federal law.
Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Marketing &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S. Ct. 2158, 2523, 81
L.Ed. 2d. 3999 (1984) .
The third type of preemption, involving a conflict be-
tween state and federal law, may arise when compliance with
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
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execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621 (1978); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581
(1944). Although in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme
Court held the pervasiveness and objectives of RCRA as a
whole could not be impaired by a state ban on hazardous
waste, the Court's decision in Philadelphia v. New Jersey
rested on "no square conflict with particular provisions of fed-
eral law or general incompatibility with basic federal objec-
tives." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 621.
In most RCRA preemption cases, state regulatory efforts
effectuate implied bans on out-of-state transportation of haz-
ardous waste. e.g. Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir.
1980); Washington Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spell-
man, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983); Industrial Maintenance Service v. Moore, 677 F.
Supp. 436 (S.D. W.VA 1987) ; Government Suppliers Consol.
Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990); New
Union, however, expressly banned imports by enacting
NUHWSSA. Opn. at 4. These cases involving implied bans
emphasize that if state law subverts federal purposes or objec-
tives by impairing specific provisions in RCRA, then RCRA
preempts state law. Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F. 2d. 743 (8th
Cir. 1986); Ogden Environmental Services v. San Diego, 687
F.Supp. 1436 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Stone, Supremacy and Com-
merce Clause Issues Regarding State Hazardous Waste Im-
port Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (January 1990) available
in WESTLAW, Tp-All Library.
By denying North and South Hampshires' hazardous
waste generators access to EDC's Springfield facility, the im-
port ban violates RCRA's land ban provisions. 42 U.S.C.
6901(b)(7)-(8). These provisions seek to avoid substantial risk
to human health and the environment by minimizing or elimi-
nating land disposal. 42 U.S.C. 6901(b)(7)-(8). EDC's Spring-
field facility is the only facility in the tri-state area capable of
disposing of DBCP. Opn. at 3. Forcing North and South
Hampshire based generators to travel to other states increases
their travel distance. As evidenced by the 1990 DBCP acci-
dent, the further the distance traveled the greater the risk to
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human health and the environment.
The Eighth Circuit in Ensco v. Dumas determined a
county ordinance prohibiting the "storage or disposal of acute
hazardous waste within its boundaries" conflicted with
RCRA's land ban provisions giving preference to treatment
over land disposal of hazardous waste. Ensco, at 744 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 6901 (b)(7), (8).) According to the Eighth Circuit,
"RCRA embodies. . . a national policy of requiring that haz-
ardous waste be treated, stored, and disposed of in a manner
that 'minimize[s] the present and future threat to human
health and the environment" Ensco, at 744. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 6902 (a)(6)). Focusing on the conflict between the local or-
dinance and RCRA, the Eighth Circuit declared:
Ordinance No. 171, however, ignores that F020 series
wastes do exist, and through its ban on storage, treat-
ment, and disposal in essence mandates that these wastes
... will not be handled in the manner deemed safest by
Congress and the EPA. Ensco, at 745.
An import ban opposing these central objectives is "in-
compatible with both the basic purpose of RCRA's Title III
hazardous waste management provisions and the underlying
policy of uniformity of states in the field of hazardous waste
disposal" and merits preemption. Rollins Environmental Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Policy Jury, 371 So. 2d. 121, 127
(1984). It is important to recognize the "residuum of power in
the state to make laws governing matters of local concern,"
that gives states the authority to govern over matters concern-
ing health, safety, and welfare of state citizens. Hunt v. Wash-
ington Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1967).
Local government's residual authority to regulate hazardous
waste is not unlimited. Ogden, 687 F. Supp. at 1446. Section
3009 of RCRA recognizes local interests by stating, " . . .
Nothing in [RCRA] shall be construed to prohibit any State
or political subdivision thereof from imposing any require-
ments. . . more stringent than those imposed by such regula-
tions." 42 U.S.C. § 3009.
Both Ensco v. Dumas and Ogden v. City of San Diego
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dealt with local regulations claiming to be "more stringent"
than RCRA. In Ogden Envt'l Services v. City of San Diego, a
California District Court examined similar problems regarding
the savings clause. Ogden, 687 F. Supp. 1436 (S.D. Cal 1988).
Facing a rigid conditional use permit operating as a ban on
hazardous waste, the court crystallized the tension involving
section 3009:
On the one hand, as defendant suggests, to construe every
permit denial as creating a de facto conflict with congres-
sional objectives would substantially eviscerate the role of
local governments in choosing one site over another, a
role presumably envisioned by the "savings" clause. On
the other hand, allowing a locality to completely evade ju-
dicial review simply by requiring a conditional use permit,
which is then granted or denied at the discretion of the
local decision-makers, creates the potential for a type of
"sham" [or] "subterfuge" 
. Ogden, at 1446.
According to the District Court in Ogden, "the express
language of the 'savings' clause only provides for more strin-
gent requirements than those imposed by the federal govern-
ment, not outright bans on such activity. Id. at 1446. Since
"state and local enactments are nullified to the extent they
actually conflict with federal law," New Union's 'more strin-
gent' import ban overextends section 3009's residuum of state
power and should be preempted. If New Union's "more strin-
gent" regulations took the form of (1) new storage disposal
capacity within the state, or (2) an interstate or regional
agreement, or (3) a contract with private management facili-
ties, all deemed consistent with federal hazardous waste man-
agement, then New Union's actions might be acceptable under
section 3009. Solid Waste Management Ass'n. v. Alabama
Dep't of Envtl. Management 910 F. 2d. 713 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied., 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1991) .
The lessons learned from cases involving implied or de
facto bans on hazardous waste are crucial. Both the courts in
Ensco and Ogden found RCRA preemption necessary where
state law subverts federal purposes or objectives by impairing
specific provisions in RCRA. If state regulations violate this
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standard by effectuating mere de facto bans on hazardous
waste, it follows that New Union's blatant and explicit import
ban should succumb to the same scrutiny.
Once held under this lens, EDC believes New Union's im-
port ban requires preemption for two reasons. First, the im-
port ban stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex-
ecution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress by
undermining RCRA's land ban provisions. Finally, since
RCRA section 3009 only provides for more stringent require-
ments than those imposed by the federal government, not
outright bans on such activity, New Union's attempt to ban
imports falls outside its delegated authority.
B. New Union's Export Ban under NUHWSSA paral-
lels the purposes and objectives of hazardous waste
regulation.
One of RCRA'S express objectives is the establishment of
a viable federal-state partnership to carry out the purposes of
the Act. Ogden Envt'l Services v. City of San Diego, 687 F.
Supp. at 1444. In developing RCRA, Congress was particularly
concerned with the states' ability to guarantee waste volumes
necessary to the success of waste disposal facilities. H.R. Rep.
No. 1491(I) 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976); 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6272. available in WESTLAW, Lh Library. For similar rea-
sons, New Union's export ban upholds Congressional intent
regarding state planning under RCRA. Congress recognized
that guaranteeing waste volume is necessary to the success of
solid waste disposal facilities and concluded "private compa-
nies are capable of and willing to enter into resource recovery
ventures if a sufficient volume of refuse can be guaranteed
over a sufficiently long period of time." Id. at 1976 U.S.C.C
A.N. 6272.
Before the export ban, fifty percent of New Union's waste
was exported to four plants located in North and South
Hampshire leaving the ten New Union based plants to vie for
the remainder. Opn. at 3. Since the control of waste collection
and disposal serves important health and safety functions,
New Union's export ban ensures that a sufficient volume of
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waste will enter disposal facilities to make then financially
feasible. Central Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metro.
Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d. 419, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1983) cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985). In essence, if New Union based
TSD facilities were forced to close due to insufficient flows,
New Union's citizens would face substantial health and envi-
ronmental risks. Therefore, EDC maintains that New Union's
export ban is consistent with the states' police power and
RCRA's legislative history.
III. NEW UNION IMPROPERLY CLAIMS THAT
104(c)(9) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRON-
MENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIA-
BILITY ACT JUSTIFIES THE STATE'S PROTEC-
TIONIST TRADE MEASURES.
CERCLA became law by Congress in 1980. By passing
CERCLA, Congress attempted to deal with the nationwide
problem of hazardous waste disposal. United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1988). CERCLA section
104(c)(9) was designed to induce states to adopt comprehen-
sive waste management plans. Section 104(c)(9) requires
states to submit an "adequate capacity assurance plan" to the
EPA by 1989, or lose Federal funding for hazardous waste
cleanup. 42 U.S.C.§ 9604(c)(9). Under this provision, a state
must assure the EPA that the state has adequate capacity to
treat and store hazardous waste for the next twenty years. 42
U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9).
New Union seeks to justify passing NUHWSSA on the
basis of section 104(c)(9). Appellee posits that the provisions
of NUHWSSA will enable it to achieve "hazardous waste self-
sufficiency," as it claims Congress demands under section
104(c)(9). Opn at 3. The import ban imposed in section 4 of
NUHWSSA, however, goes well beyond what is both required
and allowed to achieve this goal. In addition to the constitu-
tional limitations described above, New Union's import ban is
not supported by cases interpreting Section 104(c)(9), nor the
Congressional intent behind it. Stone, Supremacy and Com-
merce Clause Issues Regarding State Hazardous Waste Im-
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port Bans., 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (January 1990) available
in WESTLAW, Tp-All Library.
A. Failure to include a provision in section 104(C)(9) of
CERCLA is evidence that Congress did not intend to
allow an Import Ban.
The language of Section 104(c)(9) does not allow states to
impose import bans. Moreover, in Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, the Supreme Court expressly invalidated a New
Jersey import ban of solid waste. If Congress desired to by-
pass the Supreme Court ban on importation of wastes, Con-
gress would have explicitly done so in the 1986 amendments
to CERCLA that established 104(c)(9). S. Rep. No. 11, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 21-24 (1985). In addition, the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA), also indicates that
Congress lacked the intent to allow import bans. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(b)-(j) (Supp. V 1987). LLRWPA allows states to im-
plement import bans against radioactive waste entering from
other states. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Con-
gress was undoubtedly familiar with LLRWPA's import ban
provisions, but it refused to add similar provisions to CER-
CLA. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama
Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 721 (11th Cir.
1990).
B. Import Bans are not acceptable under case law in-
terpreting CERCLA section 104(C)(9).
An import ban similar to that found in NUHWSSA was
presented before the Eleventh Circuit in National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Man-
agement, Id. at 713. The Eleventh Circuit faced an Alabama
Statute which banned the import of hazardous waste from
states that did not comply with Alabama's statutory require-
ments. Id. at 713. Similar to New Union, Alabama asserted
the statute was directed toward State compliance with section
104(c)(9) of CERCLA. Id. at 720. The Eleventh Circuit invali-
dated the statute, primarily on grounds that it violated the
Commerce Clause. Id at 713. The Eleventh Circuit felt the
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import ban exceeded the goals of CERCLA section 104(c)(9).
Id. at 720. Although compliance with CERCLA was en-
couraged, the Eleventh Circuit determined the statute "is not
required for Alabama to comply with section 104(c)(9)'s ca-
pacity assurance requirement." Id. at 720.
The court in National Solid Wastes noted three ways in
which Alabama could comply with section 104(c)(9). It could
(1) create new disposal capacity within the state, (2) enter
into interstate agreements to gain access to use capacity in
other states, and (3) it could contract with private waste man-
agement facilities to obtain further capacity. Id. at 720. In
light of available options, NUHWSSA's import ban is not only
inconsistent with constitutional doctrine, but over steps sec-
tion 104(c)(9)'s interpreted meaning.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause the export ban
should be valid. New Union's policy concerning the health,
safety, and general welfare of its citizens is a valid exercise of
the state's police power. As a result, New Union's compelling
local interests cause only incidental effects on interstate com-
merce and enable the state to pass the tripartite Pike v. Bruce
Church test. Moreover, the nature of New Union's health and
safety objectives cannot be served as well by non-discrimina-
tory alternatives. With regard to the "stricter scrutiny" test
under Hughes v. Oklahoma, EDC believes the magnitude of
New Union's police power concerns withstand stronger consti-
tutional examination. Upon examining cases under the market
participant exemption, New Union falls within the protection
of this doctrine.
Regarding the import ban, EDC advocates that the over-
whelming weight of precedent makes import bans facially dis-
criminatory. Applying anything less than strict scrutiny runs
against established precedent and the latest Supreme Court
decisions regarding Dormant Commerce Clause and hazardous
waste management.
New Union's import ban prohibiting hazardous waste
subverts federal objectives by impairing RCRA provisions
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dealing with the transportation, storage or disposal of hazard-
ous waste. EDC believes New Union's import ban requires
preemption for two reasons. First, the import ban stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress and thereby requires pre-
emption under the Supremacy Clause. Second, since RCRA
section 3009 only provides for more stringent requirements
than those imposed by the federal government, not outright
bans on such activity, New Union's import ban exceeds the
interpreted meaning of section 3009.
New Union's attempt to justify its import ban based on
section 104(c)(9) of the CERCLA is inconsistent with both
case decisions and congressional intent. Regarding congres-
sional intent, Congress had the opportunity to include provi-
sions allowing import bans in the 1986 amendments to CER-
CLA. Moreover, Congress included import ban in the
language of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
(LLRWPA) and would have presumably done the same in
CERCLA if it desired. In National Solid Waste Management
Ass'n. v. Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a similar
import ban. Interpreting section 104(c)(9), the court provided
viable options of achieving the goals of section 104(c)(9) short
of an impermissible import ban.
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants respectually
request that the judgment of the District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Union be overturned in part and affirmed in part.
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